This paper develops a game-theoretic model of a contract between a creditor and a debtor where equilibrium depends on the damage rule chosen for breach-of-contract situations, the use of impossibility-of-performance excuses and the level of legal contract enforceability. We find that, under perfect legal enforceability, the different alternative damage rules (based on expectation or reliance damages, with or without performance excuses) are able to induce an efficient performance by the contracting parties. But we also find that, if legal enforceability is imperfect, then a rule based on expectation damages with an excuse for impossibility of performance is likely to be more efficient than the other alternative damage rules.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model of a contract between a creditor and a debtor in which both parties have the option of entering or not entering the contract, and the debtor has the option of performing or not performing. However, if both parties enter the contract and the debtor chooses to perform, there is a probability that the contract will be resolved due to impossibility of performance (or "fortuitous case," or "inadvertent breach of contract"). Different damage rules are analyzed, under which performance is excused or not in situations of impossibility, and under which damages are set using expectation or reliance rules.
The developed model is also used to analyze the issue of legal enforceability, which is measured as the probability that damages are actually paid to the creditor when the law specifies the obligation of such payment. In all cases, the different issues (damage rules, performance excuses, and legal enforceability) are analyzed to determine the conditions for the emergence of a perfect Nash equilibrium for the game.
After a brief review of the relevant literature on the topic (section 2), in section 3 we develop our model under the assumption of perfect legal enforceability (that is, damages are always paid when the law specifies the obligation of such payment). In section 4, conversely, we introduce the possibility of imperfect legal enforceability, while section 5 considers the issue of the equilibrium income distribution between the creditor and the debtor. Finally, the conclusions of the whole analysis are summarized in section 6, together with a discussion of some intuitions behind the results and a couple of ideas for possible extensions of the model.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The use of game-theoretic models to represent contract situations began with a seminal paper by Barton (1972) , but the first important formal analysis comparing the behavior of the parties under alternative damage rules is Shavell (1980) .
Most of the economic literature using the game-theoretic approach to contract law assumes that the implicit concept of liability used by that law is a strict liability standard, and disregards the possibility of using negligence standards to determine the damage levels in cases of breach of contract. However, some legal doctrines, such as the ones that rely on the concept of "fortuitous case" or "impossibility of performance," implicitly assume that there are cases in which the debtor of a certain duty cannot perform because of exogenous factors, and elaborate on excuses under which damages are not due in those circumstances.
Although the first treatments of impossibility and fortuitous case in the law and economics literature date back at least to the work of Trimarchi (1959) , the first formal analysis of performance excuses in the context of a game-theoretic breach of contract model is probably the one by White (1988) . This author argues that the impossibility defense can be a tool that helps to achieve efficiency in cases where the issue of risk-sharing is important. Using a similar approach, Sykes (1990) later found that the impossibility doctrine can also be seen as a way to introduce a negligence rule to the determination of damages for breach of contract, assimilating a situation of impossibility (or commercial impracticability) to a case in which the cost of performing exceeds a certain threshold. Following the same line of reasoning, and making use of the "model of precaution" originally proposed by Cooter (1985) , Coloma and Pernice (2000) have shown that, under suitable conditions, a damage rule that combines expectation and reliance damages and an excuse for impossibility of performance can lead to efficient levels of reliance and breach of contract.
Another contribution related to this literature is one by Bebchuk and Png (1999) , who analyze situations where breach is inadvertent rather than deliberate. They find that, in those cases, ex-ante precaution and reliance are typically inefficient under both expectation and reliance damages, although they also find that in general the expectation measure is Pareto-superior to the reliance measure. The issue of the legal enforceability of contract law is something which has appeared in this literature from the very beginning. One of the most important results in both Barton's and Shavell's analyses is that, in general, the absence of legal enforceability leads to a situation of excessive breach of contract, and this result is typically independent of the damage rule. However, it is not common to find analyses in which legal enforceability is a relative concept (that is, a concept that can be measured through a probability that ranges between zero and one), or papers that analyze what is the minimum level of legal enforceability that induces an efficient performance by the contract parties. This is in sharp contrast with a whole branch of empirical literature on the economic effects of law, which stresses the idea that legal enforceability is an important determinant of economic growth. Examples of that literature can be found in papers such as Clague (1993) and Keefer and Knack (1997) .
The model that we develop in this paper tries to capture same basic insights that appear in all of the above-mentioned literature. On one hand, it incorporates the issue of damage rules as a way to induce efficient contract performance, and the possibility that the impossibility doctrine is used to excuse performance when negligence is absent. On the other hand, it analyzes whether the different damage rules (alternatively based on expectation and reliance damages, with or without performance excuses) have different effects under imperfect legal enforceability (i.e., under situations in which the probability of actually paying damages lies between zero and one).
DAMAGE RULES AND IMPOSSIBILITY UNDER PERFECT LEGAL ENFORCEABILITY
Consider a sequential game where a possible debtor (D) first chooses whether to make an offer (O) or not (NO) to a creditor (C) about a certain contractual relationship. After that offer, the creditor chooses whether to accept (A) or not (NA). If the creditor accepts, this implies that he gives a certain amount of resources (c) to the debtor. If that occurs, then the debtor has the option to perform (P) or to breach the contract (NP). If he decides to breach, then he captures the amount of resources paid by the creditor, but he may also have the obligation to pay damages (d1) back. If he performs, then there is a certain probability (θ) that the contract will end as originally signed, in which case the creditor gets a positive profit (a) and the debtor also obtains a positive profit (b). The amount of the aggregate profit (a+b) generated by the transaction can be seen as an exogenous parameter. However, the way in which this aggregate profit is divided basically depends on the provisions of the contract.
Assume now that, in the event that the contract has to be resolved due to impossibility of performance, the creditor loses the amount of resources that he originally paid and the debtor earns nothing. This occurs with probability 1-θ. It is also possible that, in such a situation, the debtor has to pay damages to the creditor (d2), which may or may not be the same damages that he has to pay if he chooses to breach the contract.
The game described in the previous paragraph is graphically represented in figure 1 , where the probabilities θ and 1-θ are assumed to be drawn by Nature (N). In each possible final node of this diagram, we first specify the profit received by the creditor and then the profit received by the debtor.
Figure 1
One key assumption of the model developed here is the idea that impossibility of performance is something that can be verified ex-post by a third party (e.g., by a court of justice). However, we will also assume that it is
• (0; 0)
something that cannot be precisely defined ex-ante, so that it cannot be included in the contract as an event upon which the parties can contract. This type of contractual incompleteness will therefore have to be filled by certain rules established by contract law, and this is why we will assume, for the rest of the paper, that damage payments d1 and d2 will basically depend on the legal standard existing in the situation under analysis. Note also that this game depicts a situation in which signing and performing a contract may or may not be ex-ante efficient. For the contract to be efficient, it has to hold that its aggregate expected profit (which is equal to a+b times the probability θ) is larger than its aggregate expected loss (which is equal to c times the probability 1-θ). This implies that:
which is a situation that occurs when the impossibility of performance is relatively unlikely and/or when the amount of resources immobilized is relatively small in relationship to the aggregate profit obtained under actual performance.
All of this implies the following three inequality conditions:
If we consider damage rules that do not allow for performance excuses, then d1 = d2. The basic alternatives here are expectation damages and reliance damages. Under expectation damages, the creditor has to receive an amount of money so that he is equally well-off as under actual performance, which implies that d1 = d2 = c+a. Under reliance damages, he has to receive an amount of money so that he is equally well-off as under a situation with no contract, which implies that d1 = d2 = c.
If we introduce an excuse for the case of impossibility of performance, then a rule based on expectation damages implies that d1 = c+a a n d d2 = 0 . Conversely, a rule based on reliance damages with an excuse for the case of impossibility implies that d1 = c and d2 = 0. A fifth possible (hybrid) rule would be to allow for expectation damages in the case of deliberate breach of contract and for reliance damages in the case of impossibility of performance. That would imply that d1 = c+a and d2 = c.
Using the definitions stated in the previous paragraphs, we can now prove the first proposition of our paper.
Proposition 1: Under perfect legal enforceability, if contracting is efficient (i.e., if θ > c/(a+b+c)), then any of the five possible damage rules (expectation damages with and without performance excuses, reliance damages with and without performance excuses, and the hybrid rule that allows for expectation damages in the case of deliberate breach of contract and for reliance damages in the case of impossibility of performance) are capable of inducing efficient behavior on the part of the contracting parties.
Proof: Let us first assume that damages are defined using a rule of expectation damages with no performance excuses. In that case, the general inequality conditions become the following:
Note that equation 6 is satisfied by assumption, and that equation 5 is satisfied whenever contract performance is efficient (since it is identical to equation 1). The binding condition that has to hold for this damage rule to be efficient is that the debtor chooses to make the offer to the creditor (equation 7). But this will always be possible if the debtor chooses a relatively convenient division of the aggregate profit between the creditor and himself (that is, a relatively large b and a relatively small a ), since the creditor will always be willing to accept his offer for any a > 0.
If, instead of expectation damages, compensation is based on reliance damages with no performance excuses, then the set of conditions for performance to occur becomes the following:
As we see, equation 9 (i.e., the condition for the creditor to accept the debtor's offer) is once again satisfied by assumption, and in this case the condition for the debtor to perform is the same as the condition for the debtor to make his offer (since equations 8 and 10 are identical). Considered together, the three conditions can be fulfilled when the contract is efficient, since, in his offer, the debtor can always choose a suitable division of the aggregate profit with a relatively large b and a relatively small a.
If we now turn to damage rules that allow for excuses in cases of impossibility of performance, the first possible alterative is a rule where d1 = c+a (expectation damages) and d2 = 0. Under that rule, the set of conditions for performance to occur is:
By assumption, equations 11 and 13 are satisfied here, since both θ and b are positive numbers. The binding condition, instead, is the one stated by equation 12, but this can also be satisfied whenever the contract is efficient. For this to occur, the debtor has to offer the creditor a sufficiently large profit a.
Similar results occur when the damage rule allows for d1 = c and d2 = 0 (reliance damages with an excuse for impossibility of performance). In this case, the set of conditions for performance to be a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium becomes:
and once again the binding condition is acceptance of the contract on the part of the creditor (which is this case is equation 15). This, however, can always occur whenever the contract is efficient, for the same reasons stated in the previous paragraph. A last possible scheme is the one that allows for expectation damages in situations of deliberate breach of contract (d1 = c+a) and reliance damages in situations of impossibility of performance (d2 = c). In this case, the conditions to hold are the following:
By looking at these conditions, we see that equation 18 is satisfied by assumption, and that equation 17 is satisfied whenever equation 19 is. The critical condition is therefore equation 19, which is the same condition that is binding in the case of reliance damages with no performance excuses. As happens in that case, it is possible to fulfill this if the contract is efficient, since the debtor can always choose a suitable division of the aggregate profit with a relatively large b and a relatively small a. q.e.d.
DAMAGE RULES AND IMPOSSIBILITY UNDER IMPERFECT LEGAL ENFORCEABILITY
Let us now assume that the legal system under which contracts are enforced is imperfect, so that the actual payment of damages in cases of breach of contract (and, eventually, in cases of impossibility of performance) is subject to a certain degree of uncertainty. Let us define a probability (π) that damages are actually paid when they are due, so that the expected levels of d1 and d2 under the different damage rules will be equal to ̟·(c+a), if expectation damages are awarded, or to ̟·c, if reliance damages are awarded. When we introduce imperfect legal enforceability into the model, the critical element that arises is its impact on the debtor's decision to perform his duties. This impact is different under the different damage rules, and implies a different re-statement of equation 2 under the alternative systems. This restatement also implies that there are damage rules able to induce an efficient behavior for relatively low levels of ̟, while other rules require a relatively high level of that probability parameter, as the following propositions show.
Proposition 2: Under imperfect legal enforceability, if contracting is efficient (i.e., if θ > c/(a+b+c)), then there is a certain minimum probability that damages are actually paid when they are due (̟), which is necessary to induce the parties to enter the contract.
Proof: Assume, for example, the existence of a rule based on expectation damages with no performance excuses (i.e., d1 = d2 = ̟·(c+a)). In that case, satisfying equation 2 implies that:
while, under a rule based on reliance damages with no performance excuses (i.e., d1 = d2 = ̟·c), the corresponding condition becomes:
If, conversely, we use expectation damages but allow for an excuse for the case of impossibility of performance (i.e., d1 = ̟·(c+a), d2 = 0), the debtor will choose to perform if it holds that:
while a rule that allows for reliance damages with an excuse for impossibility of performance (i.e., d1 = ̟·c, d2 = 0) implies that the corresponding condition is:
Finally, in a case where expectation damages are due when there is a breach of contract, but reliance damages are due when there is impossibility of performance (i.e., d1 = ̟·(c+a), d2 = ̟·c), then the decision between performing and breaching the debtor's obligations implies that performance is preferred if it holds that:
If we now compare the conditions implied by equations 20 to 24, we can observe that all of them define a certain minimum level of probability that damages are actually paid when they are due (that is, a certain minimum ̟). If it holds that c > θ·b, then that minimum probability is a positive number, and it is therefore impossible to induce performance in a situation of no legal enforceability (i.e., when ̟ = 0). q.e.d.
Proposition 3:
Under imperfect legal enforceability, if contracting is efficient (i.e., if θ > c/(a+b+c)), then the minimum ̟ required to induce the parties to enter the contract is lowest for the case of expectation damages with an excuse for impossibility of performance, and highest for the case of reliance damages with no performance excuses.
Proof: Note that the formulae derived for the minimum probabilities implied by equations 20 to 24 all have the same numerator (equal to cθ·b). Therefore, the relative magnitudes of those minimum probabilities are entirely determined by their denominators. As the parameters a and c are positive numbers, and θ is a number between zero and one, it is easy to observe that the largest denominator corresponds to the case of expectation damages with an excuse for impossibility of performance (equal to c+a), and the smallest corresponds to the case of reliance damages with no performance excuses (equal to θ·c). This implies that the former damage rule is the one that requires the lowest level of legal enforceability (that is, the smallest minimum ̟) to induce performance, while the latter is the one that requires the highest level of legal enforceability (that is, the largest minimum ̟). q.e.d.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IMPLICATIONS
Let us now explore the implications that the different damage rules, performance excuses and levels of legal enforceability can have on the distribution generated by a contract like the one analyzed in this paper. Recall that the division of the expected profit is not exogenous but rather a result of the actions of the players. Let us rename the aggregate expected profit using the symbol A (so that A = a+b), and let us assume that the player that moves first (in this case, the debtor) has to offer a certain division of that profit, using shares λ (for the creditor) and 1-λ (for himself). The game analyzed therefore becomes the one represented in figure 2 . Under this restatement of the problem, it is possible to prove that the different damage rules generate different income distribution implications, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Under imperfect legal enforceability, if contracting is efficient (i.e., if θ > c/(a+b+c)) and performance is preferred to breach (i.e., if ̟ is sufficiently large), then the minimum profit share (λ) required to induce the creditor to enter the contract is lowest for the case that allows for expectation damages with no performance excuses, and higher for cases that allow for excuses based on impossibility of performance.
Figure 2
Proof: Let us first assume that the damage rule under analysis implies expectation damages with no performance excuses. If both θ and ̟ are sufficiently large so that entering the contract is efficient and performance is preferred to breach, then the binding condition to determine the equilibrium level of λ is equation 3 (that is, the condition that states that the creditor must prefer to accept the debtor's offer). For that condition to be satisfied, we need that:
If we now consider a situation where the damage rule assigns reliance damages and does not accept performance excuses, then the binding condition becomes:
and this is also the case for the hybrid rule when expectation damages are awarded if there is a deliberate breach of contract and reliance damages are due in cases of impossibility of performance.
Finally, when there is an excuse of impossibility of performance (and damages for breach of contract are either expectation or reliance damages), the binding condition for the creditor turns out to be equal to:
If we now compare equations 25 and 26, we see that they both have the same numerator, but that equation 25 has a larger denominator. This means that the minimum λ required by equation 25 is lower than the one required by equation 26. Conversely, if we compare equations 26 and 27, we see that they both have the same denominator, but that equation 27 has a larger numerator. This means that the minimum λ required by equation 26 is lower than the one required by equation 27. Taking the two results together, we conclude that the minimum λ required by equation 25 (i.e., by the damage rule that implies expectation damages with no performance excuses) is the lowest, and the minimum λ required by equation 27 (i.e., by the damage rules that allow for excuses based on impossibility of performance) is the highest. q.e.d.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The different versions of the model analyzed in this paper generate three basic conclusions: a) Under perfect legal enforceability, the five different damage rules under consideration (i.e., expectation damages and reliance damages with and without an excuse for impossibility of performance, and the hybrid rule that uses expectation damages for situations of deliberate breach of contract and reliance damages for impossibility situations) can all induce an efficient behavior of the contracting parties when it is exante efficient to enter the contract. b) However, under imperfect legal enforceability, the debtor is induced to honor his promise only if the probability that damages are actually paid remains above a certain threshold. That threshold is highest if the damage rule implies reliance damages with no performance excuses, and lowest if it implies expectation damages with an excuse for impossibility of performance. c) Different damage rules and levels of legal enforceability can also have income distribution implications. If, as our model implicitly assumes, the division of the expected profit is to be decided by the debtor and has to be accepted by the creditor, the existence of performance excuses induces a smaller profit share for the former and a larger profit share for the latter.
These three conclusions depend on several assumptions that we have made in this paper, but we believe that they also have some interesting implications that go beyond the borders of our simplified model. The first of them is the "Coasian idea" that, in the absence of imperfections, any sensible damage rule is equally efficient. That is the essence of the result of proposition 1, in which we assume that either promises are fulfilled or damages are actually paid, and therefore it is easy to induce performance using different systems. A second important result of this paper is the idea that, when enforceability is not perfect, then damage rules do matter, and that some of them may be more efficient than others. In particular, we have obtained a "Beckerian result" about the convenience of setting higher damage payments for cases of breach of contract. We have found that, with relatively low levels of legal enforceability, those payments (e.g., expectation damages) are able to induce performance in cases where lower damage payments (e.g., reliance damages) are not.
We have also found that introducing performance excuses may also relax the need to have a high level of legal enforceability, since those excuses increase the expected profit of the debtor's decision to fulfill a contract. Indeed, if the debtor knows that he will not be liable in situations in which he has tried to perform his duties but it was impossible to do so, that implies that the expected profit for performing is larger, and therefore the gap between the expected profit for performing and the expected profit for breaching is also larger. A last, less important, result has to do with the distributional implications of the different damage rules. If we allow for performance excuses that benefit the debtor, then the creditor will only enter the contract if he can obtain a larger profit share when there is actual performance. On the contrary, the creditor's profit share under actual performance can be minimized if no performance excuses are allowed and damages are based on the expectation measure, since in that case the creditor is fully insured by the debtor against the event of impossibility of performance.
The simplicity of the stated model, however, makes the validity of some of these results relative. For example, we have assumed that the level of legal enforceability (π) is invariant to the damage rule chosen, when it is possible that such enforceability may be higher under a system with no performance excuses than under a system that allows for excuses based on impossibility of performance. If this were so, then our second conclusion (i.e., the one based on the result of proposition 3) could change.
Another important assumption that we have made is that both the level of reliance expenditure (c) and the probability of an impossibility situation (θ) are exogenous parameters. In a more complex model these two values could be endogenized, and this would allow for the presence of different adjustment processes under different damage rules. An interesting extension of the present paper, therefore, would be to study what happens with the relative efficiency of such damage rules if we suppose that the creditor could choose the level of c and the debtor could influence the value of θ (for example, by choosing a certain level of precaution so that impossibility would be more or less likely). Our guess is that this endogenization would not matter in a situation of perfect legal enforceability, but that it may very well have an impact under imperfect legal enforceability.
Another interesting line of research inspired by the results of this paper is to see if we can establish an empirical relationship between the use of performance excuses in contract law and the level of legal enforceability. If we found that countries with lower levels of legal contract enforceability tend to allow for the use of performance excuses more often than countries with higher levels of legal enforceability, then that would be evidence that would Breach of Contract, Impossibility and Enforceability / 79 support the main conclusions of this paper. Casual observation of the main bodies of law seems to suggest that performance excuses are more pervasive in countries with codified civil law and less common in countries whose private law is based on common law. This could have some correlation with the level of legal contract enforceability that those countries exhibit.
